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ECHOES FROM THE GREAT DIVIDE:
ON THE FALTERING PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUE
BETWEEN AFRICA AND THE WEST
PETER ABSPOEL

ABSTRACT: Even in the field of comparative or cross-cultural philosophy, distinctive
contributions by African philosophers are often side-lined – that is, relegated to niche
publications. Why is it so hard for African philosophers to draw their Western colleagues
(other than specialists in African philosophy) into a real dialogue? An attempt is made to
describe the field of tension; it is shown that some of the reflexes that manifest themselves in it
reveal not just the attachment to specific perspectives or frames of reference, but also implicit
ideas about the nature of the “philosophical game”. On the Western side, motives constitutive
of practical or traditional life are either ignored or tacitly equated with attempts to realize
goals that can be best understood from a reflexive point of view. In this way, the concrete
conditions of any human activity, including intellectual activity, are lost from view. This critical
lesson has been spelt out by a number of philosophers (Maurice Blondel being one of them),
but is seldom taken to heart. As a result, it becomes difficult to penetrate beyond conceptual
differences. It will also be maintained that while many African philosophers question
intellectualist attitudes, they do not always do so in a way that invites discussion on the central,
or basic, issues.
Keywords: African philosophy, comparative philosophy, cross-cultural philosophy,
intellectualism, Maurice Blondel, practice

Yet words are thieves that lull the watchman
– Mazisi Kunene
1. INTRODUCTION
Many African cultural products are widely appreciated in the West. Music travels most
easily; but there is also a flourishing market for African novels, films and works of art.
In fact, modern African literature finds a wider audience in the West than in Africa
itself. Distinctive contributions of Africans to philosophy are less lucky (not counting
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some popular tracts on ubuntu). It isn’t just that fewer people are interested in
philosophy than in music or literature. Proponents of African philosophy have a hard
time getting the attention of their Western colleagues, and drawing them into a real
exchange of views. Why is this so?
Here I will present my own view on the matter in broad strokes. My excuse for
employing this rather coarse technique is that I aim to offer a fresh perspective which
may further discussion. Over the years, I have explored the gap between the African
and Western intellectual worlds in different ways, as a cultural anthropologist and a
philosopher of culture. I am also familiar with literary circles which offer a contrasting
example: here differences of perspective are welcomed and seen as a source of
enrichment.
First, I would like to draw attention to the paradoxical nature of the indicated state
of affairs. The paradox can be stated in the following way. Philosophers attempt to rise
in thought to general principles structuring life. And in many cases they believe
concrete life is structured to a high degree by conceptual schemes, tied to language,
that differ from one culture to another. Now, following their logic, one would expect
that a maximum of meaningful interaction between cultures would be realized among
philosophers, who share a technical language capable of bringing out both contrasts
and similarities. But the facts seem to belie this thesis (at least as far as relations
between Africa and the West are concerned). Should we assume a lack of interest, or
bland ethnocentrism, on the side of Westerners, as some African philosophers, like
Jonathan Chimakonam (2018a), do? But why would philosophers differ in this regard
from other Westerners? It would be important to see if the philosophical perspective
itself (in its customary forms) hides from view potential points of contact that nonphilosophers manage to find more easily. Why would novels, that are also composed of
words, travel almost effortlessly through the membranes separating cultural worlds,
while philosophical views tend to get stuck?
Here I will try to shed some light on factors hampering the philosophical dialogue
that are hardly ever discussed by the participants themselves. This requires adopting a
wide perspective, which allows us to situate the discussion (not just the views) in the
context of culture patterns, while also taking into consideration the particularities of the
“philosophical game”.
It is hoped that a better understanding of the issues at stake will allow the dialogue
to move forward and engage more participants. By no means do I intend to downplay
the amount of productive interaction already taking place between committed
philosophers. However, these “good examples” often (have to) place themselves
outside of the mainstream of current philosophical debates. Or rather, they have to
struggle against a current powered by an, often implicit, “paradigm” of universalism
and anti-traditionalism, which tends to obscure the philosophical relevance of ideas
betraying a greater respect for common sense and for the life which nurtures it. But I
will also maintain that African philosophers sometimes expound their views in a way
that makes them unnecessarily difficult for Westerners to digest.
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2. ON THE APPROACH
In order to get to the bottom of the issue, I think it is necessary to thematize the relation
between philosophical knowledge and the kind of knowing that people rely on in
practice, or ordinary life.
Western philosophy thrives on diversity, that is, on comparing different views. At
the same time it reduces this diversity by limiting itself to views that can be discussed
in abstraction from life. Major strands of African philosophy seem to question this
procedure and its normative assumptions; but they often do so implicitly. Therefore
they risk being seen as “too different” by Westerners. If an attempt is made to connect
thought to practice, this is often done by employing the terms of hermeneuticians,
Wittgensteinians, and sometimes post-structuralists. This involves the risk of
subscribing to a semantic-ontological relativism that is in fact a shadow of the Western
contempt for tradition that African philosophy set out to challenge. Meanwhile, posing
as “the other” (in Western eyes) can stand in the way of a critical discussion on reified
cultural identities and views. Internal differences between points of view – such as
those between men and women – may be smoothed over by insisting Africans are
“communalists”, for example.
In comparative philosophy, different strategies have been devised to drive out the
specter of “radical incommensurability”, with its attendants of conceptual and moral
relativity – invoked by Richard Rorty (1989), among others. Some posit similarities
that can be integrated in a universalistic model (like Martha Nussbaum, 1993); some
suggest that by learning about the other tradition we can get accustomed to a world of
different meanings and values (David Wong, 1989, for example); others believe in the
possibility of a Gadamerian “merging of horizons” which brings a cognitive gain; here
we can think of Alasdair MacIntyre (1990, 1991), who combines a hermeneutic view
of tradition with an Aristotelian view of the virtues. Donald Davidson (1980, 1982) and
Michele Moody-Adams (1997) also point a way out of incommensurability through
interpretation. Often it is supposed that language and conceptual schemes are
constitutive of life-worlds and human experience. This (very common) assumption
deserves to be questioned – at least in its more categorical forms. The problem of
translatability may come to haunt comparative philosophy to a point where differences
in attitudes to life or ways of thinking either seem absolute, or seem insignificant,
depending on the function one assigns to language.
As Richard Bernstein (1991) has suggested: the very idea of incommensurability
may be the product of a desire to reduce “the other” to the same which dominates the
Western philosophical mind; and the desire to rehabilitate the other as the completely
different, as undertaken by Emmanuel Levinas, may be seen as its mirror image. Now,
we can say that, in Western philosophy, the other that is either ignored, prematurely
assimilated or appearing as an opaque anomaly also presents itself in the form of
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practical life. But this “other” we need to be (or become) ourselves, and therefore it
cannot be totally alien or devoid of philosophical significance.
Valuable resources for gaining insight in the relation between reflexive thought and
unreflected experience can be found in the works of Maurice Blondel, Michael Polanyi,
Pierre Bourdieu, and Bruno Latour. Their views cannot easily be amalgamated,
however. Let me try to state in a few words what important lessons we can learn from
these authors. I shall also point to what I consider to be the limitations of their views.
(1) Bourdieu (1980) warns that we tend to misconstrue the kind of motives that
human beings rely on in practical life if we want to explain them on the basis of explicit
(e.g., religious or ontological) views. There is a logic of practice, encapsulated by the
habitus, which can only be understood in relation to life as experienced in concrete
situations, and in time. Thus, he says, anthropologists are wrong if they believe the
behavior of people is guided by the synoptic views of cultural worlds (often exegesed
as a coherent text, full of symbolic harmonies and contrasts) they capture in their
monographs. In fact, if they do so, they make a double mistake; they confuse views
with motives, and they confuse the views they construe as observers with those held by
the people they study (51 ff.). This criticism, I would say, applies to philosophers as
well, especially to those who focus on the view of life given with or in language, myths,
etc. (Many African philosophers, as we shall see, also seem to think that cultural views
determine the practical attitude to life of groups.) However, I would say Bourdieu’s
concept of the habitus (see e.g. 1980, Ch. 3 and 4) is itself tainted by a reductionist
logic. This is not too apparent, as he stresses the interdependence of concrete and
semiotic determinants of action. But the latter predominate – even though they are not
seen as the product of conscious reflection. The habitus is supposed to generate
thoughts, feelings and actions on the basis of elementary oppositions, which are
internalized so deeply that they seem indistinguishable from the body. Another problem
with Bourdieu’s model is that it is so general that it makes it difficult to focus on the
differences between cultures. Everywhere, people are disposed to make the most of
their “symbolic capital”, trying to convert it into power; but this capital consists of
arbitrary ideas, distinctions, expressions of taste, etc. (see Bourdieu and Passeron 1970;
Bourdieu 1979). Although Bourdieu wants us to realize that we are prone to mistake
arbitrary distinctions for natural ones, and thereby (often unwittingly) help to reproduce
existing power relations, it isn’t clear at all what resources remain for giving meaning
to life once we have shed our blinkers.
(2) Latour, on the other hand, has a great deal to say about cultural differences,
especially those between the modern West and “premodern” societies. The Western
feeling of superiority, he claims, is tied to the idea that modern science and philosophy
have allowed a process of intellectual “purification”, leading to the establishment of a
clear-cut distinction between the objective and subjective, the natural and the social,
the non-human and the human (1993, 10 ff., 29 ff.). Modern Westerners take pride in
the fact that they have distanced themselves from a premodern mentality, which mixes
up meanings and facts. Thinking of nature in deterministic terms, they can feel liberated
from traditional constraints, and free to engage in social experiments. They also feel
they are in possession of a universal yardstick by which they can measure the “others”
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– or their cultures. But according to Latour, the Western, modern self-image is largely
a deliberately entertained fiction (39 ff.). The Great Divide, imagined to separate the
West from the rest of the world, is in fact a projection of an internal divide, which cuts
across the lives of all, including scientists (97-99). The objects science deals with are
“quasi-objects”, “hybrids” composed of objective and subjective elements; the
scientists are embedded in networks of action that mediate between the human and the
extra-human in a way that is not accounted for in their epistemologies. What distinguishes Western society, is the scope and diversity of these networks (117). A host of
“quasi-objects” is produced, along with a host of different kinds of subjects. But the
whole is still a social construction, including the action of focusing on the objective
properties of natural things. Westerners, therefore, should realize they are not really
different from those they think they are separated from by the Great Divide (103). The
networks in which they are at home, are “simultaneously real, like nature, narrated,
like discourse, and collective, like society” (6). He also stresses that these networks,
while being constructions, always have to accommodate a host of given human
concerns. In every society, people accept the reality of very different things, which
come with their own discourses: nature, technology, ethics, love, religion, art, etc.
Though Latour offers a cogent criticism of views that reduce everything to physics or
to language, I feel he too easily resigns himself to the incommensurability of different
human motives or “modes of reality” (see Latour 2012). It is enough, he seems to think,
if we do not let our quest for objective knowledge repress our other spontaneous
interests. In this way, he thinks, we can realize the ideals pursued by Enlightenment
thinkers, which have been lost from view since the human sciences tried to “purify”
the view of man as well as that of nature (1993, 35-36, 142). Thus, in the end, one
wonders if doing justice to the inner divide (in his view) really amounts to the same
thing as breaking down the Great Divide.
(3) Polanyi, like Latour, points out that scientific knowledge is not something sui
generis. He focuses on the epistemic foundations of knowledge, not only stressing the
importance of social conditions, but also the fact that it is impossible to structure
knowledge on the basis of facts and logic alone. Every kind of explicit knowledge, that
we can express in words or mathematical symbols, requires tacit knowledge to become
thinkable. If we attend to things we want to know, we always attend to them from
something else, which remains unsaid, and always at least partly unsayable (1966, 10).
For example, if we want to study a frog in laboratory, we still need tacit knowing to be
able to trap and manipulate one – and even to know what kind of animal we are looking
for (20-21). Science requires specific skills which, like any skills, can only be acquired
by imitating others in practice. Many unspoken rules must be internalized tacitly,
before we are able to intelligently commit ourselves to scientific activities (29 ff.). We
can only grasp and apply “articulate frameworks” if we come to inhabit them like our
body, or if they come to “dwell” in us (1956, 208; 1966, 17). By using these metaphors,
Polanyi wants to emphasize that, though a conception of reality may direct our thinking
and actions, it doesn’t limit us in the way explicit assumptions do: it rather stimulates
our creativity and reminds us that there is always more to know. He judges the value
of (internalized) conceptions of reality by their productive capacity; and to him, modern
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science, because of its proven ability to discover and explore new realms of reality, and
to describe their structure, is clearly superior to traditional ways of thinking (e.g., 1956,
224-226). Somewhat like Latour, he criticizes scientists not for what they do, but only
for not properly understanding what they are doing – that is, for not acknowledging
their dependence on conditions they cannot grasp in scientific terms. To him,
ultimately, tacit knowing is a condition for acquiring knowledge in a methodical way.
At some point, he believes, our typically human, word- or concept-dependent
knowledge takes over, allowing us to recognize intelligible patterns not immediate
given in our sense-dependent experience, and to test hypotheses (1966, 70 ff.). We
always need intuitive thinking to invent, understand or criticize theories; but scientific
(or philosophical) thinking, though participating in the spontaneous processes
responsible for tacit knowing, is reasonable in a way that our immediate experience is
not.
(4) Blondel (though the first-born of the philosophers mentioned) goes further. Like
Polanyi, he maintains that we always need to combine some form of direct knowing
(connaissance directe, pensée réelle) with discursive thought (e.g. 1934b, 21 ff.). But
unlike Polanyi, he doesn’t see practical knowledge as just a condition for theory.
Neither form of knowledge supplies the building blocks which allow us to construct a
closed world, intelligible in itself; and we cannot merge both cognitive perspectives,
creating one picture of reality. Practice and theory, he says, do not “duplicate each
other’s efforts” (1906a, 561); we need them both, and we need something transcending
them both, and mediating between them, in order to enable them to enrich each other.
Therefore, we never live in a world of facts, objects, or ideas, able to be stabilized in
or by thought. Our conscience can never exhaust what we experience, and neither what
we think (e.g., 1934a, 221). Even if there is a richness in experience which is reflected
in irreducible or incommensurable kinds of knowledge, Blondel doesn’t believe – as
Latour seems to do – that we can resign ourselves to a life consisting in a succession of
experiences which are meaningful in completely different ways. All we experience and
think about is relevant for us, he claims, because we believe it can bring us further; or,
to put it differently, because we think it can help us to become more ourselves.
Disparate experiences must have something to do with each other; for if we hadn’t been
able to integrate them, at least in a provisional way, we couldn’t have become what we
are. This means that there is no ready-made recipe for realizing ourselves (further). We
are faced with a “problem of action” (or “problem of life”; see e.g., 1893, 24, 28) which
cannot be reduced to an intellectual problem: we want to find out what we can become
by responding to very diverse stimuli (internal and external) inciting us to look for a
life that is richer or more promising than anything we can realize relying on our active
powers and our ideas. We fall into the trap of intellectualism if we think we should, or
even could, tailor our expectations to a reflexive inventorization of what life has to
offer (see e.g., 1934a, 163-164).
Blondel’s view of the relation between praxis and theory makes him assign an
indispensable role to tradition. Without being initiated into a concrete, traditional way
of life, he says, we would never become aware of “the problem of life”; and we need
the provisional answers that traditions supply us with (not just views and ideas, but also
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ways of acting) to have any idea of what we want to become (see e.g., 1893, xiii, 427
ff.; 1898, 213). Tradition doesn’t just provide a group with specific views or ideas; it
is also a life which enables a “fertile contact” between people (1976, 1140-1141); and
this means that the “philosophy” people actually live by can never completely be
explicated. It belongs to the task of an “integral philosophy”, according to Blondel, to
point this out (e.g., 1936, 232; 1937, 319 ff,). Blondel’s philosophy offers many
important clues, I believe, for African philosophers thinking about the meaning of
tradition, and also for diagnosing the (excessive) intellectualism that closes the Western
philosophical perspective to any kind of “traditional wisdom”. It also seems to align
well with the metaphysical preoccupations expressed in many African views of reality.
However, Blondel entertains some notions which I find questionable, like the idea that
human beings are driven by a desire to make everything they feel to be meaningful a
possession, and also the idea that every form of transcendence found in life must
somehow correspond, in a way we cannot fathom, to the absolute (see Abspoel 2018).
One important point on which these thinkers agree, is worth noticing: the sphere of
practical life has a (relative) autonomy in relation to “reflected life”; therefore we
should resist the temptation to reduce the dynamism of life to thinkable motives. Much
of Western philosophy suffers from defects stemming from intellectualism; and many
African philosophers, either as a result of their formation, or because they want to be
taken seriously by Western philosophers, also tend to overstate the human dependence
on explicit views and language.
Reflexive constructions are often the center of attention. Take this rather typical
statement by Kwame Gyekye (he builds here on the views of Alexis Kagame and John
Mbiti, and doesn’t seem to be aware of echoing Johann Gottfried Herder): “...language
does not merely suggest, but may also embody, philosophical perspectives. For it seems
that every language implies or suggests a vision of the world” (1995, 31).
Once this principle is accepted, it seems logical to try to elucidate a specific “vision
of the world” by studying constructions made of words. The limitations of this
approach can be illustrated by looking at the article “An Outline of a Theory of Destiny”
by Segun Gbadegesin (2004). The conception of destiny the Yoruba believe in is
delineated by presenting myths, which describe how every human being chooses his or
her destiny before being born. In the way typical of the analytical philosophical
tradition (which has influenced many English-speaking African philosophers)
Gbadegesin distils from the myths a number of propositions in order to assess their
logical compatibility. The living human being is supposed to be composed of different
parts, some of which are “added” after the acceptance of a destiny, or after birth, which
raises the problem whether there is, in the circumstances described by the myth, any
complete person able to choose. After stating the logical problems involved in the
“traditional view”, the author points out that in real life people do not seem to be
hindered by them, and that, moreover, they do not seem to accept the implications of
the view they hold. They “act as if they believe that destiny is alterable” (65). Now,
from a Blondellian perspective, this would be begging the question whether we can say
that the view expressed in the myths is really the “philosophy” people live by, and this
should prompt us to look for signs that show that the mythical propositions are
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somehow balanced against others, within a more comprehensive view of life. Why
would we choose to take Plato’s “Myth of Er” (found at the end of The Republic),
which states a very similar view, not literally, and not pick it apart in the same way?
Are the Yoruba, unlike Plato, unable to distinguish between the mythopoetic and the
real? Why couldn’t people be impressed by the fact that persons are different, and seem
to be “destined” for a certain life, while maintaining that they are responsible for what
they turn into, and for the way they use their talents? The fact that therapeutic rituals
exist which aim to change a person’s “chosen” destiny (hinted at by Gbadegesin on
page 65), doesn’t answer the question how much of the myth is taken literally –
especially outside of the ritual context.
On the other hand, it will not do to deny to conceptual schemes any relation to
reality. This is what Kwame Anthony Appiah seems to do, relying on some unexpressed anti-essentialist, nominalist dogma. According to him, the Akan belief in
sunsum (the individual spirit, the main bearer of one’s personality) is in the end equally
unfounded as the Western belief in the mind (2004, 33). This is a form of skepticism
that cannot be carried through: we would have to deny that our knowledge reflects in
any way the structure of reality. Our conceptual knowledge may be always tentative
and fragmentary (as Blondel holds), but it also represents something real; we can gain
nothing by pushing it to drown itself in the flux of life (or atoms), which is itself a
product of our thought and imagination.
I believe it would be helpful – for the dialogue – if philosophers recognized the
need of a common ground outside of philosophy; or, to put it more aptly, if they realized
they are standing on it already. This ground, I would like to say, cannot be reduced to
some specific kind of “background knowledge”, or to things that seem self-evident to
people sharing a particular “life-world”, “habitus”, or Gadamerian “prejudices”. It
underlies all that. Only if we believe in the possibility to understand each other as
human beings, questions about the translatability of conceptual schemes or narratives
can arise.
3. THE PECULIARITIES OF
THE AFRICAN PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE
As an academic discipline with its own goals and methods, African philosophy came
into existence when the era of colonization ended. African intellectuals, especially
those who were trained in the West, felt the need to take stock of the riches inherent in
African cultures, past and present, which they had been taught to neglect or even
despise. In the early novels of the Ghanaian writer Ayi Kwei Armah we meet such
intellectuals who are at home neither in the West nor in Africa. One of these novels is,
tellingly, titled Fragments. Armah was taken to task by the well-known Nigerian writer
Chinua Achebe (1975, 39 ff.) for spreading a kind of despair that ordinary Africans
were – mercifully – not ready for. In his later novels, Armah evoked an idealized precolonial past, starkly contrasting with what he saw as a materialistic, soulless and
predatory Western way of life.
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Many of the founders of (modern) African philosophy lived in the field of tension
evoked by Armah. Some were tempted to prove their worth by emulating Western
examples, and thus, by their very definition of philosophy, to spurn the wisdom that
has been cultivated on the soil of African life for ages. Others devoted themselves to
“excavating” traditional wisdom, by collecting proverbs, epics and myths, or
interviewing sages, and presented their findings as a ready-made alternative philosophy,
fully-equipped to face the philosophies of the West or East. The shortcomings of both
approaches soon became a point of discussion. Initially there was very little agreement
on what African philosophy should look like. After decades of polarization (among
different schools, universalists and traditionalists, professional philosophers and
“excavators of philosophical sagacity”, Afro-deconstructionists and Afroconstructionists, to mention just a few epithets), now many accept that African
philosophy, properly so called, must be critically engaged with African traditions, and
explicate values and ideas that Africans adhere to up to today. There are still disputes
going on between those who believe African philosophy is just in the making, and those
who think it is already there, only waiting to be put into writing.
Even if they were intent on proving that African “sagacity” and philosophy could
hold their own in a confrontation with Western or Eastern philosophies, most African
philosophers initially aimed at boosting the self-confidence of their fellow Africans, or
helping them overcome a sense of inferiority inculcated by colonialists. But there has
been a change. Some now confidently address the world at large. Here we can think of
Achille Mbembe (e.g., 2000). Drawing on the historical experience of Africans, he
denounces developments like privatization, individualization and globalization. In
Mbembe’s view, the present-day world-wide “power elite” (to borrow a term from the
sociologist C. Wright Mills) has the same mentality as colonizers had in Africa; and
therefore the fate of oppressed, disenfranchised or enslaved Africans can serve as a
warning for the future. (By the way, a similar view was expressed earlier by Armah;
one of his characters in the novel Why Are We So Blest? observes, thinking about
Americans: “Why should I be so unhappy at this perception: that centuries of
purposeful destruction should produce new generations of children born to destroy
effortlessly, naturally, easier than they breathe?”)
4. THE OBSTACLES PREVENTING
A FRUITFUL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS
Now, with many, I believe that it would be a good thing if intellectuals in other parts
of the world paid attention to views propounded by African thinkers – both views which
directly challenge Western attitudes, and those which simply represent the wisdom
cultivated in African traditions.
But the cross-cultural dialogue seems to be hampered by a number of factors. (One
sign of this is that major international journals devoted to comparative philosophy carry
few, if any, articles by Africans or on Africa; those writing on African philosophy
mostly have to rely on niche publications.) Some of the obstacles are present in the
minds of participants, others are hardly ever mentioned, perhaps being “too large to be
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seen”. I will attempt to shed light on some of them, keeping in mind the observations
made above on the relation between philosophy and the “unreflected life” – that is, the
myopia easily induced by excessive intellectualism. At the same time, I think it is
important to recognize the conditions of a shared humanity, which allow us to speak of
wisdom or philosophy in the first place, and not to sacrifice them on the altar of a
respect for diversity.
What kind of obstacles do I have in mind? Let me present an indicative list (I am
not pretending it is exhaustive).
a) The scarcity of written traditional sources
This obstacle I mention only for the sake of completeness; it has been discussed from
the outset. African philosophy, taken in a broad sense, suffers from neglect by Western
philosophers, because these tend to think only authoritative or “canonical” texts are
worth studying and commenting on. Therefore, traditions dependent on oral
transmission are at a disadvantage. Kwame Gyekye has stressed the fact that thought
is always the product of an individual mind (1995, 24 ff.). But somehow it matters,
according to the rules of the “philosophical game”, whether the author of a text can be
identified or not. By now, of course, there are many books by African philosophers; but
many of them present traditional ideas, with a view to either defending or criticizing
them. I believe, however, that the lack of a fixed “traditional” corpus which can serve
as a starting point for commentary and criticism doesn’t fully account for the
asymmetry in the discussions between African and Western philosophers.
b) Divergent views on the role and function of philosophy
African philosophy departed from Western models by attempting to demonstrate the
philosophical fruitfulness of African traditions. The attitude African philosophers took
towards their cultural environment was very unlike that taken by the Greek founders of
Western philosophy. They wanted to reconnect with a given life and way of being,
whereas the Greek philosophers distanced themselves from their traditions, in order to
gain a critical perspective that wasn’t accessible to the “unreflecting mind” – they
wanted to sift episteme (truth) from doxa (uncritically-held views). We could say that
African philosophy started as a love of the wisdom that was already there; while for
the followers of Socrates philosophy was a love of the intellectual powers which allow
a transcending of the given and received. This doesn’t mean that African philosophers
depreciated critical faculties. They insisted that myths and sayings were the product of
conscious reflection, for example; but they also stressed the fact that this reflection was
tied to the felt responsibility to contribute to a rich social life.
The attitudes of African philosophers towards the “traditional” past were far from
uniform or unambiguous, however. From the beginning, the doubt was raised whether,
under the heading of “tradition”, philosophers (and anthropologists) weren’t studying
ideas and practices that had been imposed from the outside, or had been transmogrified
by the colonizers. There was no uncontaminated tradition, according to some; which
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meant that, in their view, the elements of a truly African philosophy had to be
reconstructed. This has led to (in my view) rather questionable attempts to minimize
the congruence between African and Western views. Some, like Okot p’Bitek (1979),
went as far as to say that all metaphysical ideas referring to a separate, unobservable
dimension of reality were the product of Western (mostly religious) indoctrination –
and this view is still being defended, by D.A. Masolo (2004), among others. Over
against the Western “dualistic” view, an African life-world is posited; though it
includes all kinds of spirits, it is a self-contained world, in which human concerns and
material things are not contrasted with something “higher”. This view has been
challenged by Emefie Ikenga Metuh; according to him, it was rather the resistance to
Western ideas that led (some) Africans to abandon their metaphysics: if the Europeans
claimed possession of the only true God, and accused the Africans of worshiping only
spirits, they would demonstratively turn to the spirits, and abandon the cult of God
(1981, 164). (See also Mohammed Majeed 2013, who criticizes Kwasi Wiredu’s
contention that Akan conceptions of the person do not go beyond the “quasi-physical”.)
Some, like Paulin Hountondji and Peter Bodunrin, and also Wiredu, were not intent
on rediscovering an untainted, indigenous African philosophy; they advocated a new
approach, which would be properly philosophical instead of descriptive. Wiredu (1976)
maintained that much of what was presented as African philosophy was in fact “folk
philosophy”, and could only be fruitfully compared to uncritically-held views among
folk strata in other parts of the world. Even if this criticism may apply to the “ethnophilosophical” approach instanced by Placide Tempels’s Bantu Philosophy (the
adjective was coined by Marcien Towa [1973] and meant to be pejorative), I believe
he conceded too much. It is doubtful whether any philosophy can develop without the
support of “naive” views – and Gyekye has given good reasons for supposing it can’t
(1995, 25). Edwin Etieyibo (2018), Jonathan Chimakonam (2018b) and I. A. Menkiti
(2004), among others, have also pointed to the fact that philosophical reasoning is
always rooted in historical traditions, or, according to an expression of the latter, in the
thought of “the village”; the same point has been made by some Western philosophers,
like Hans-Georg Gadamer (1965). A big question here is, whether Western critical and
objectivist views also developed under the pressure of an attitude to life that was
adopted uncritically. (My answer would be “yes”; see below.)
c) Ontological incommensurability
I think it is fair to say that the great majority of African philosophers question or oppose
the Western “disenchanted” worldview. They do not dismiss, out of hand, the possible
existence of all kinds of forces or beings that, in the language of the early disenchanters,
should be labelled as “occult”, and which they therefore refused to admit in their
rational explanations of the universe (deities, spirits, ancestors, and powers allowing
the exercise of sorcery, witchcraft and divination; some Westerners would place God
in the same category). Western philosophers boast of a tradition that started, with the
Ionians, by questioning “naive” views. In this tradition, Occam’s razor was applied
long before it had a name. Even in the heyday of metaphysics, “higher principles” were
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only admitted if they were deemed necessary for explaining the nature and existence
of beings in general. This logic eventually led to the discarding of God, in Laplace’s
model, because the “hypothesis” of a first mover or a source of being no longer seemed
necessary. In the foreshortened view of many Westerners today, the success of Western
ways of thinking and acting is due to a desire to explain everything in terms of natural
laws. The development of modern science is seen as the result of the courage to let facts
speak for themselves, and to let them contradict “intuitive”, anthropomorphic conceptions of reality. Post-Enlightenment thought is praised for allowing us to control the
natural world in unprecedented ways. Of course, it is precisely this desire for control that
African thinkers like Mbembe condemn as a sign of an exploitative, destructive and
inhuman attitude to life. Latour, as we have seen, has pointed out that the Western,
“modern” self-image was largely the product of self-deception.
Some African philosophers try to avoid a clash between worldviews by describing
the African one in very general terms – by saying it implies a logic transcending
opposites, or by focusing on the principles of African ethics (the interdependency of
human beings, the directedness towards a fulfilling community life, etc.). But even they,
when they let their guard down, often let some ontological notions creep in that may
bewilder Westerners (at least, those not acquainted with African life). Some, like
Gyekye (e.g. 1995, p. 201 ff.) and Martin Odei Ajei (2014) contend that the vindication
of the African cultural perspective(s) ultimately rests on proofs establishing the reality
of paranormal phenomena. (How this statement can be reconciled with Gyekye’s claim
that language determines our view of the world, is a brain-teaser.)
Now, I am not one of those Westerners who would categorically dismiss the
possibility of non-physical influences. But, as I have often told my African friends, I
believe that at least 95 percent of the stories about preternatural occurrings (the dead
coming back to life, the effectiveness of magical methods, etc.) are... how to put it
delicately?... the product of the imagination. Some stories about strange happenings are
simply too good not to be retold. But there is something else. In the traditional
“economy”, we could say, the institutions of divination, magic, and even witchcraft,
are “too big to fail”. Criticizing them would amount to invalidating the traditional
“solution to the problem of life”, which is based on the assumption that everything must
go well as long as everyone obeys the prescriptions of tradition. These prescriptions
therefore need an infallible foundation. No matter how ambiguous or conflicting the
diagnoses of problems pronounced by individual diviners may be; it is imperative to
maintain the belief that at least some of them get it right.
Of course, we should also ask which tenets of Western thought are deemed “too big
to fail”, as the abandoning of them would undermine the physicalistic paradigm, which
in turn buttresses the freedom cherished by the bourgeois to do whatever they like (see
Abspoel 2017). Some Westerners think that any proof of, say, telepathy, would
destabilize their whole conception of reality, and would invalidate their faith in common
sense. Some defenders of the African worldview think it would validate traditional
beliefs, along with their idea of common sense. What may easily be lost from view in
this scuffle, is that the kind of common sense on the basis of which people usually give
meaning to their lives may not be tied to the one or the other philosophical conception
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of reality, and may, so to say, happily remain oblivious to such questions.
Interestingly, we don’t need to subscribe to any “strange” definition of reality to
understand the way the protagonists of African folk tales get into and out of their
predicaments. Problems may be defined by referring to miraculous powers of people
or animals. But it is not the mastery of esoteric knowledge and fixed routines (like those
employed by the diviner) that provide solutions. Special powers never substitute for
good sense. It is shrewdness, or even cunning, that wins the day, or, if used unwisely,
backfires. The moral is often that it pays to take the advice of other, wiser people. The
hero of one story, who unaccountably has been struck with blindness and impotence,
frequents traditional healers. They “continued to tell their lies and robbed him of his
money. But Alatishe thought: the man who refuses to buy lies will never buy a truth.”
But his money runs out, and in the end, it is not a healer or diviner that helps him solve
his problems; it is his senior wife, who devises of a way to reconcile, by trickery, the
conflicting demands of two birds that offer to cure one of his ailments (Gbadamosi
1968, 17).
Yes, as Blondel points out, we may need to believe in some kind of transcendence
in order to have the sense that our spontaneous intuitions and ideas cohere, and to be
open to a “more complete truth” (1893, 375); but this belief strengthens the faith in our
normal cognitive faculties and basic common-sense notions. The belief in this kind of
transcendence is reinforced by religious traditions. They invite people to recognize
their dependence on invisible beings; but they also teach that the most important of
these are, so to say, interested in safeguarding the harmonious functioning of the
cosmos and society. Therefore, we cannot equate religion with a belief in extraordinary
psychic powers. Usually, such powers are not needed to approach the invisible beings
invoked in religious ritual; they are certainly not needed to appreciate the kind of
“goods” they are implored to deliver.
A belief in exceptional powers of cognition, supposedly conferred by gods or
spirits, may be attractive for several reasons. “Seers” may help account for seemingly
fortuitous happenings, and may suggest courses of remedial action where instrumental
solutions are unavailable. But whether such powers are real or not, there is always a
price to be paid for expecting too much from them. There’s a thin line between
mysteries that attract our attention because we feel a greater receptiveness to them can
make our life richer, and mysteries that may undermine our very ability to give meaning
to life. The danger may be averted to some extent, by attributing exceptional powers to
specific functionaries (diviners, mediums, sacred kings, etc.), and by assigning to them
the task to restore or maintain the normal order of life. But we may still come to believe
in a blinding light which makes the little light which allows us to make sense of our
lives look insignificant. (And the much-maligned Christians would say we need a
divine intervention to save us from this danger – that is, to keep faith in our humanity.)
The way traditional beliefs in an “occult economy” immunize themselves against
falsification is another problem. Every kind of misfortune is usually explained by
pointing to actions that must have disturbed the proper “cosmic order”; that is, to acts
of malevolent human beings or spirits, and often, at the same time, to transgressions of
the victims that must have deprived them of supernatural protection. Or else, adversity
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is attributed to a neglect of religious duties. No amount of evidence can break this logic
(which, by the way, is not specifically African). If views of life containing such beliefs
are defended, or presented as alternatives to the “disenchanted” view embraced by
modern Westerners, the latter tend not only to object to them on ontological, but also
on moral grounds – as they may easily lead to the blaming of victims. Skirting around
such issues is not a solution: critics may be encouraged to reject the “strange” cultural
perspective as a whole. Clearly, there is no easy way out; by removing all traces of
belief in invisible powers, one would render the portrait of African life and thought
unrecognizable.
The belief in paranormal powers is also real enough; still, I would say too much is
being made of them, when it is suggested the whole African worldview rests on it. Once
more it is worthwhile to take note of the contrasting case of African works of literature,
which suffer much less from any ontological incommensurability, even if “occult”
beings or powers figure in them. It clearly matters whether the reader is invited to look
at a strange environment from the perspective of acting human beings, whose motives
and responses somehow remain recognizable, or whether the “anatomy” of the alien
world is described in abstract terms. Stories invite us to understand the way people deal
with situations, and the way they interpret life, without judging. The philosophical
elucidation and confrontation of views of life, on the other hand, invites readers to take
a critical stance; the way such views function in the lives of others, or in our own lives,
may easily escape notice.
d) Pitfalls associated with the hermeneutical approach
In order to avoid a competition between incompatible ontological models, many
African philosophers have taken recourse to a hermeneutical approach, avowedly or
unavowedly. (The “conversational school” – see Chimakonam 2020 – can be said to
employ a hermeneutical procedure.) This means that they compare conceptual
representations of the world without pronouncing on the “objective truth” of either of
them. By doing this, they can unwittingly confirm the idea – entrenched in the Western
bourgeois mind – that every moral philosophy, religion or Weltanschauung is in the end
equally unfounded (see Abspoel 2016, 2017). By making this concession, a dialogue
can be maintained between different traditions, and between groups defending or
questioning the traditional past (many female intellectuals falling in the latter category),
but at a high cost. Ontological relativism is a double-edged sword for those wanting to
preserve or change things. Also, dubious hermeneutical assumptions – like the
idealistic a priori that the human mind only has access to a reality structured by
language or concepts – go unquestioned. And clearly, the sought-for dialogue will
exclude many potential participants, like Westerners who view all traditional
conceptions of reality with suspicion. Just expounding belief systems without trying to
justify them, except by showing their internal, conceptual coherence, may easily have
the effect of reinforcing existing prejudices and stereotypes.
Some forms of pressure, ensuing from the situation in which African philosophy
developed, seem to have fostered the tendency to reduce traditional ways of life to
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explicit or explicable views. A surprisingly large number of works written by African
philosophers focus on “indigenous” views of man, that is, on traditional philosophicalanthropological ideas. These may have been singled out because they were deemed to
be the clearest proofs of the presence of philosophical reflection in African life. But
often they are made the subject of philosophical scrutiny, as philosophical
constructions, without studying the “context” of the life in which they function. And
this becomes almost ironical, when it is maintained that African philosophical views
betray a respect for the concrete.
This focus on explicit views has been strengthened, I think, by what could be called
political considerations. African philosophers wanted to distance themselves from the
Western, colonial discourse, and rejected its universalist pretensions, or “logocentrism”
(see e.g. Chimakonam 2019, 3). But after tearing this discourse into shreds, and
denying the human mind access to any universal “givens”, they ended up with
fragments which were still made out of language. In a way, they wanted to do what
Enlightenment thinkers had done: to break away from a constraining tradition
(Chimakonam, in his Ezumezu, praises Francis Bacon for discarding metaphysics
[2019, 7]); but they wanted to do this in order to rehabilitate – at least part of – the
African traditional cultural heritage. It is perhaps because they were fighting this twofront war, that they often ended up defending traditional views as an alternative
discourse. “Postcolonialism” in theory recognizes or even celebrates particularity and
diversity, but it also brings with it a deep distrust of uncritically-held convictions and
values.
It is all too understandable that African intellectuals were impressed by the
frightening power of stories (like the stories told about them by colonialists, or
presenting the Western way of life as absolutely superior). Some of the philosophers
among them were inclined to imagine that society was the product of some cybernetic
process in which stories or theories were the main determining factors. Thus they came
to justify different traditions as the productions of people who freely followed their
own reasoning. The question whether people expect more from life than a defensible
interpretation of phenomena and experiences, risked getting sidelined. It has often been
claimed (see e.g. Barry Hallen and Sodipo 1997, 5; Lott 2011, 26) that African
philosophy differs from Western philosophy in being more open to other disciplines,
like social and cultural anthropology, sociology and political science. This is not untrue,
but I would say African philosophers have often been very selective in what they
appropriated from the other sciences, privileging approaches stressing the dependence
of the human mind on language, and (though this applies less to women philosophers)
neglecting accounts of how traditional ideas have been used to justify inequality, or
may have evolved to deal with structural tensions within social systems (see e.g.,
Douglas 1966).
Now, I do not deny that language molds our reflections and may propose categories
that determine the way we deal with specific kinds of objects (or persons). But I do not
believe language encapsulates a full-blown culturally-determined attitude to life. If we
want to understand culture patterns, we must pay close attention to things that, quite
literally, go without saying. For example, the drive to prove oneself in battle (or in some
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other kind of struggle; practicing extreme sports, or sailing single-handedly around the
world), which has been an overriding concern for Western elites since immemorial
times, doesn’t depend on words. It depends on what I call a “subreflexive” motive; and
I believe this motive dictates a preference for certain reflexive views instead of being
determined by them (see Abspoel 2016, 2017). It certainly strikes me as odd to try to
explain such an attitude to life on the basis of some feature of grammar. And I don’t see
any good reason for assuming that “ordinary” people, who are not in the grips of such
overriding concerns, are any more stuck in the ruts of grammar or semantics.
Having said this, I do not deny that the anthropology of the Yoruba, the Igbo, the
Luo, and so forth, are equally deserving of philosophical attention as the anthropological models of Plato or Descartes, for example. They are a part of life, but they
don’t, by themselves, determine all the actions and thoughts of people. It is true, people
may often follow the received wisdom, and stick to social norms. They may seem to
fly by some autopilot, believing they cannot do better by taking over control. But this
is largely an illusion. As Polanyi and Blondel remind us, they wouldn’t be able to think
anything, or do anything consciously, unless they experienced some support of “tacit
knowing” and “direct knowledge”. And people who speak the same language, and share
the same cultural views, may pursue very different ends.
So I think we should say that the structures that language creates never coincide
with the structures that people experience as meaningful in life (see Abspoel,
forthcoming). A number of anthropologists – like those who explored the role of the
“performative” – have made this point too. An example is Roy Rappaport. He does see
language as a grid we impose on reality and which influences our response to it by
creating oppositions (between insiders and outsiders, good and bad, permitted and
taboo, etc.). But he also points out that language, if left by itself, or rather if left at the
mercy of individuals, would only create confusion, discord, “Babel” (1999, 26, 166,
321). The most important “digital” (yes/no) distinctions, separating periods in the lives
of communities or individual, or separating acceptable from unacceptable views, are
created and supported by means of ritual actions. In order to be accepted as
authoritative, meanings and beliefs need to be internalized by the (repeated)
participation in rituals, which make them seem evident, and imbue them with a sense
of the sacred. Now, Rappaport follows Émile Durkheim (1912) in thinking the sacred
is just a societal production, needed for social cohesion. It is necessary as a functional
illusion; but the light it provides overrides our critical faculties and therefore cannot
serve as a criterion for anything. I think he would have done well to take note of
Blondel’s criticism of the Durkheimian view; it is not really cogent to think that social
facts can mold human aspirations without appealing to (and letting themselves be
conditioned by) some disposition or desire rooted in the individual (see Blondel 1906b).
Meanwhile, I believe Rappaport is right in emphasizing that in order to have faith in our
thinking, we need to have faith in a host of other things that cannot be thought, let alone
be replaced by thoughts.
The point I want to make is quite simple. In accounts of African life, found in
stories, novels, and ethnographic literature, we find a life that is fed by many springs,
and which has many “dimensions” – it is composed of instrumental actions, reflections,
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affections, desires, all kinds of joys, even mystical experiences. I would think it is part
of the philosopher’s job to try to do justice to the nature, the conditions, and
interconnectedness of all these things. In order to do this, he or she must use language.
But one should always be wary of the temptation to pretend that the same power that
allows one to conjure up an image of life must be responsible for creating what is being
imagined. In other words, one should face the (difficult) task of trying to say something
about how, and to what extent, our understanding of the connections between many
different kinds of things corresponds to the connections given in reality. It is tempting
to embrace a model which will decide for us which phenomena we should save and
which we should “send walking”. But then, we’ll have to cope with the fact that in real
life we often decide otherwise.
Of course, African philosophers have every right to thematize the pressures they
experience, and the way these impinge on their thoughts. But sometimes I wonder if
such pressures aren’t receiving a more eloquent expression in the works of novelists
(we can think again of Armah, but also of Chinua Achebe and many others), who show
them affecting real people. African philosophers are acutely aware, more than most of
their Western colleagues, of what Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie has called “The danger
of a single story” (2009). But many of them seem to have a preference for “stories” that
can be understood in abstraction from concrete life, leaving one to wonder in what
sense exactly they are about life. The constructivist or hermeneutical – basically
idealistic – assumption that we make sense of life by imposing on it the logic of stories
(or “schemes”, see e.g., Bruner 1990), often obscures the fact that we need the
experiences provided by life as much to make sense of stories as the other way around.
e) Misconceptions about the role of philosophical and scientific rationality in the
West
Those engaged in the dialogue – both Africans and Westerners – tend to think that
scientific rationality plays a much larger role in Western life than it actually does.
Maurice Blondel, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Pierre Bourdieu, Claude Levi-Strauss, Michael
Polanyi (who coined the term “tacit knowing”), Michel de Certeau, and Bruno Latour
(“We have never been moderns”), have pointed out, each in their own way, that in the
West “pre-scientific” ways of thinking are more than just survivals in the
anthropological sense. Westerners, like people in other societies, couldn’t live in a
recognizably human way unless they often rely on forms of common sense which they
cannot defend in theoretical terms. Some Western thinkers have pretended that they
could offer “rational” recipes which could take over the function of common sense.
And many think this fancy has been realized. As not only Westerners, but also Africans
are prone to embrace this misconception, a potentially valuable point of contact is missed.
Western and traditional African views of life are often opposed, and seen as separated by
a Great Divide, or grand partage (Latour 1983, 1991). This split seems far less absolute
if we focus on the kinds of thinking or knowing human beings actually rely on in ordinary
life. If we realize we all depend on ontological intuitions we cannot relate to an explicit
view of life, we can find a possible common ground, and will remember that the African’s

Comparative Philosophy 12.1 (2021)

ABSPOEL

20

life-world, too, is composed of much more than elements that can be represented in
cosmological or mythical models. (As suggested above, folk tales can function as a foil
to mythology.)
f) Vestiges of ethnocentric, racist and colonial attitudes
I have maintained elsewhere that it is a psychological necessity for Westerners to
believe that their recipes for creating wealth, equality, and well-being are the best the
world has ever seen (Abspoel 2016). Even if their application happens to have very
negative – e.g., ecological or social – consequences, they like to believe that Western
rationality offers the best remedy. Philosophers are by no means immune to this
syndrome, which has been nurtured over the centuries. They can try to be respectful,
but this doesn’t necessarily mean they are really open to the others’ point of view, or
are willing to admit that the principles of some good or essential things may elude their
grasp. Of course, many African philosophers are acutely aware of a Western sense of
superiority. But often they reduce it to intellectual prejudices (Léon Sobel Diagne
mentions those of Hegel, Lévy-Bruhl and Heidegger [2004]). In my view, this
syndrome is “powered” by sub-reflexive motives – like a will to believe that individual
passion or thinking power must suffice to find a complete solution to “the problem of
life”, to use Blondel’s term. The traditional conditions of human experience, and of all
forms of rationality, are easily lost from view, and seldom considered seriously. Thus,
the belief in a Great Divide is reinforced, as well as the tendency to disparage what is
to be found on the other side of it. Here, by the way, it doesn’t help that plans to
modernize societies in a distinctively African way have largely come to nothing. Few
shining examples, therefore, can be cited to demonstrate what can be gained, in modern
life, by giving precedence to African precepts. The democratic temper of many African
traditions is robbed of opportunities to express itself. This situation is partly due to
relentless economic and political pressure exerted from the outside, which was
capitalized upon by local elites. Increasing individualism and economization have
turned life into a grim struggle for many millions of Africans. Westerners with a taste
for cheap wins can indulge themselves (once again). There is no easy fix, obviously,
but I believe it is important to try to get to a clear and recognizable diagnosis of the
ailment, and to refrain from accusing all “sufferers” of deliberate ill-will.
5. THE HEART OF THE MATTER
I have tried to list some factors that, in my view, impede a constructive dialogue
between African and Western philosophers. It has not been my intention to prescribe or
proscribe anything. Perhaps my exposition suggests that it is mainly the African
philosophers who should change their tack. For good measure, let me point out that I
believe that, in the current climate, the onus is on them, and unfairly so. If they present
African interpretations of the world, they may seem in the eyes of Westerners to come
from a strange planet. They will have to justify the fact that they do not draw the line
between folk philosophy and “real philosophy” the way their Western colleagues do.
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And it is up to them to try to convince the latter that the kind of views they make the
object of scrutiny are not the only sources of meaning people (including themselves)
rely on. As I said, I believe they could do themselves a service by stressing the fact that,
also in Africa, explicable views do not determine the whole of life, and that, therefore,
African life is less strange than it seems when one takes myths or ontological models
as a starting point.
To some African philosophers – those stressing the particularity of African views
of life – the criticism applies that the anthropologist E.E. Evans-Pritchard long ago
levelled against Lucien Lévy-Bruhl. If it were true, Evans-Pritchard said, that
“primitive thought” differs altogether from Western thought, as Lévy-Bruhl maintained, “we would scarcely be able to communicate with primitives [this term was then
still being freely employed], even to learn their languages. The single fact that we can
do so shows that Lévy-Bruhl was making too strong a contrast between the primitive
and the civilized” (1981, 127). And he says, “It is not so much a question of primitive
versus civilized mentality as the relation between two types of thought to each other in
any society, whether primitive or civilized, a problem of levels of thought and
experience” (131). Here, Evans-Pritchard contrasts associations of a “mystical” kind,
which he believes are aroused in ritual situations, with the kind of knowledge people
rely on in “practical affairs, which they conduct in an empirical manner” (128).
In my view, there are more than two “levels of thought and experience”. A metaphor
might help here. Our knowledge of reality – taken in the widest possible sense – is like
light broken by various prisms. One of these prisms produces discursive or speculative
thought (relating to many subjects). Another furnishes us with rules that govern our
behavior in traditional settings, which appear self-evident, but which can only partially
be traced back to explicit views. In our spontaneous interaction with other people we
rely on a kind of tacit knowing which provides a light of its own. The world of natural
phenomena (including human bodies) evokes all kinds of intuitions and associations,
often more or less spontaneously falling into a pattern of correspondences and contrasts
(edible-inedible, harmless-dangerous, attractive-repulsive, etc.). And then there is the
light which allows us to adapt instrumental actions to the structures and workings of
“empirical reality”. This list is only meant to be suggestive; some might want to add
the “light” of love and war, of ritual and narrative and art, or other things. Clearly, some
of these prisms are shaped by particular cultural and historical forces; their shape may
even distinguish one social group from another within the same society; others are
much less variable. From a reflexive point of view, it is difficult to understand how we
somehow manage to combine the light provided by these different prisms. But the real
complexity of life is even much greater. Each sphere of life (and these spheres are also
variable social productions), like the economic, the religious, the political sphere, or
the sphere of family life, is characterized by special kinds of reflection, special
intuitions, even special ways of treating concrete objects (or bodies). The same holds
for different stages of life, which are sometimes clearly separated. And then, what we
think or perceive by virtue of these different “kinds of light” depends to a large extent
on what we want to do; and our aims may vary from a desire to acquit ourselves of
traditional obligations to a passionate desire to impose our will on a world imagined to
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be refractory. Such attitudes to life, determining the actual actions and thoughts of
people, collectively or individually, are themselves factors shaping both the “structure”
of reality and the way it appears to actors. Given all these baffling complexities, how
are we able to understand other people at all? But somehow, as Evans-Pritchard says,
we at least do so to a certain extent, or else we wouldn’t be able to communicate; and
we are able to communicate, even with people from other cultures, about many things
that are relevant to us.
Now, I don’t intend to abuse my metaphor, by asking where the light is coming
from that is refracted, in different ways, by these various prisms. We only see things in
the broken light; we cannot turn around to see the prisms themselves, let alone the
source of light hidden behind them. And there is no good reason for supposing (like
Platonist metaphysicians do) that the source of the light contains in itself all the
intelligibility of what we can see by it. At the same time, we cannot suppress the feeling
that, however distorted our view may be (or the views we attribute to others), these
prisms are capable of revealing aspects of one reality. That is, we feel that, at least
normally, associations imposed by our cultural habitus or individual passions do not
constrain our experience or thinking to the point that they have nothing to do with
reality. I think Blondel was right in suggesting that we switch between different
perspectives in order to do justice to a reality that we cannot directly perceive as a
whole (or, as Polanyi would put it, can “attend to focally”). But reality, viewed as
something independent of us, is never the only integrating factor. A way of life can only
exist and keep existing (except for some time under a despotic regime) if it offers to a
significant number of people experiences which they find fulfilling, and if it encourages
them to have expectations of life. The meaningfulness of life, I would say, is not
something projected by a special prism; it is rather a sense or a state of being more or
less contented, happy, and hopeful, which is produced in some sort of black box which
processes many different kinds of experience.
I don’t think I’m stretching my metaphor too far, if I point to the temptation, that
especially philosophers are vulnerable to, to think that one of these prisms does not
refract light coming from somewhere else, but is actually the source of the light in
which we see ourselves, reality, and life. This may be called the temptation of
“foundationalism” (see Rorty 1979). A common form of it is the tendency to think that
we can understand reality by reducing it to physical processes, and human motives by
reducing them to pragmatic concerns. Another is the tendency to view the whole of our
experience as mediated by “symbolic structures”, “cultural categories”, or language. In
reality, I believe, we cannot get away from the belief that the truth has something to do
with a light which is diffusely reflected in our general experience, and in what we may
call (with some reservations) “common sense”. We always invoke its authority, even
when we focus on the patterns projected by our chosen prisms. And that is why, as
Blondel has remarked, we can never actually stick to any intellectualistic conception
of reality: in order to think an idealistic view, for example, we need to smuggle in
realistic notions, and vice versa (1906a). In order to have any conception of reality, we
must believe in a reality that transcends our representations of it.
Once we recognize this, questions concerning the “office” of philosophy loom
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large. Are philosophers supposed just to reflect on reflections – that is, on the patterns
produced by the prisms of discursivity or language? But then, which? Those giving
shape to religious views, those guiding pragmatic exploits, those structuring social
relations...? Or should they try to understand the whole tangle of human motives and
ways of thinking? Philosophical traditions often decide these matters, and they decide
differently in different cultures.
The interesting thing about comparative or cross-cultural philosophy as a
discipline, is that it makes it hard to evade these questions. How does philosophy relate
to culture? Can it relate to truth at the same time? And if we believe it can, can it do so
without being supported by modes of knowing that cannot be converted into conceptual
knowledge? Are cultural perspectives mutually exclusive, or do they complement each
other? But if they’re all relative; what are they relative to? How and where are we to
drive a wedge between the real and illusions induced by wishful thinking, false ideas
about causal connections, etc.? Philosophers can ask such questions; this doesn’t mean
they can answer them all. Western philosophers standing in the Enlightenment tradition
often feel they cannot afford to admit their inability to answer them. They stick to a
way of thinking which originated in an arms race with religious thinkers. They either
believe modern science allows us to distinguish fact from fiction, or they believe (in
idealist vein) that we cannot penetrate the veil of concepts or language that separates
us from “reality in itself”. They are ready to pay the price of having to declare that all
cultural meanings are to a large extent illusionary or arbitrary. The attitude African
philosophers take towards religion is different: they may reject dogmatism and Western
metaphysics, but usually do not reject the, basically religious, notions that are
constitutive of traditional life-worlds. So they bring back questions which Western
(secular) philosophers feel have been dealt with satisfactorily.
Africans who reflect on the relation between philosophy and culture, will often be
faced with the belief of their Western colleagues that Western intellectual culture is not
really a culture. In other words, many Western philosophers think they are not
dependent on cultural ways of thinking and categorizations, the way the “others” are.
Latour, I think, has described the syndrome well. The African philosophers, on their
part, often think that Western views are “too rational”, or rather, intellectualistic, and
therefore fail to do justice to important aspects of life or reality. Their unwillingness to
accept what they feel to be constraining categories and ways of thought partly explains
their problem to make themselves heard by their colleagues in the West. But I feel they
compound their problem by associating the “African perspective” too closely with
patterns produced by specific cultural “prisms”, and especially by exaggerating the role
of language.
Let me try to give an example. In many African cultures it is believed that human
beings participate, through some rather mysterious faculty (I can’t think of a better
word), in a life which embraces the whole universe, and which is supposed to flow
from the supreme being. We find this belief expressed in the Akan concepts of okra and
honhom (Gyekye, 1995, 88), the Igbo concept of chi (Metuh, 68 ff.), the Luo concept
of chuny (Masolo 2004, 100), the Oromo concept of ayana (Bartels, 112 ff.) – and this
is a random sample that could easily be expanded. In old-fashioned metaphysical terms,
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these concepts differ mainly in the degree to which something emanating from the
supreme being is supposed to be contracted in the individual (sometimes seen as
independent of particular properties – a “breath of life” –, in which case other parts of
the person are usually identified, sometimes as individualized, but comprising the
whole of the person, or his or her “soul”). But is it really appropriate to describe this
(supposed) participation in something transcending the realm of the concrete as just a
part of the person, as many African philosophers do? True, it concerns something
which is considered to be separable from the body or other “parts” of the person (at
death). But at the same time we should say: for someone who believes “it” really exists,
it can never be just available as an object of thought – something one can focus on and
define –; it will, so to say, be also “behind thought” (even more than any conceptions
of reality that we, according to Polanyi, might “attend from”). After all, we would be
dealing with a condition of our capacity to experience and think anything. This means,
to invoke my metaphor again, that something that is supposed to reflect or refract a
transcendent light, is represented as refracted by the prism of conceptual thought; and
the problem is that the conceptual gain is hardly ever offset against a possible loss of
intelligibility. I would say that it is the reluctance to think in metaphysical terms that is
– at least partly – responsible for the fact that attention is often diverted from basic
philosophical issues. When treated as ideas or parts of systems of thought, traditional
ontological notions hinder the reflection on the conditions of any kind of philosophical
thinking. And once one reifies the most internal sources of intelligibility, their relation
to other supposedly intelligent “beings” (spirits, ancestors, God, etc.) can only be
specified by having recourse to a symbolic or psychological logic. Something, I would
say, is bound to get lost in the process.
Attempts to resist reification of what is being signified by traditional ontological
concepts, by insisting they are built out of language, make matters worse. African
philosophers may think that by adopting a constructivist of hermeneutical view, and
staying away from metaphysics, they make differences seem less absolute; but they
will discover their Western counterparts, often unconsciously, apply very definite
ontological criteria (which seem self-evident to them). The problems of incommensurability or untranslatability often become unsurmountable as a result. Most Western
philosophers, it seems, are only ready to talk in their language about issues that can be
made to seem relevant using their language. The conditions of all thought and
conscious action that (to invoke Polanyi’s phrase) cannot be said, are hardly ever
thematized. I think a real dialogue can only begin once this is being recognized. To
return to my metaphor one last time: I don’t think this requires a radical turning around,
a facing of the light – an exchanging of shadows for the sun, as in Plato’s allegory of
the cave. Philosophers need not become mystics, or follow the later Husserl in trying
to distinguish some transcendent light allowing us to see our “life-world” as a whole
(1970). But there is a negative criterion we can apply, once we realize that the many
different ways in which we manage to grasp something of reality depend on each other.
People who think they can explain how everything coheres by invoking one or a few
principles, often cannot explain how they manage to think such a thing, or even how
they are able to conceive of anything like a truth. Also, we can take heart from the
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achievements of literary writers (or the anonymous authors of folk tales), who are
somehow able to show how people in practice manage to combine the light refracted
by different “prisms”, without losing the sense that they are living their own lives or
the sense that they share one world with others.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
My aim has been to take a step back, and try to see what is going on in a field of
discussion, realizing it is a field of human action as well. I have not tried to privilege
any particular kind of factors, such as those that can be expressed in well-worn
philosophical terms. Neither have I chosen to privilege any other viewpoint, like that
of the anthropologist or the sociologist of knowledge. In order to combat prejudices
standing in the way of a real discussion, it doesn’t suffice to identify them, and show
them for what they are. It is important to understand how they came about, how they
affect our way of thinking, and above all, how they keep us from understanding
ourselves.
Comparative philosophy can contribute both to the problem and to its solution. It
contributes to the problem, if it shirks from recognizing the conditions of all kinds of
human wisdom, regardless of their “substance”, and with that, the conditions of any
real dialogue. It can work towards a solution, if it inquires into the way different
reflexive views (such as theories or myths) find support in reality, or human experience,
without considering any of them to be the last word, and without pretending that the
real can be defined or grasped in the same way as such views. Only by applying this
“method” we can stop ourselves from being lured toward mirages of epistemic certainty
(of a foundationalist or constructivist type). If we want our intellectual journey to end
in a world we share with others, we need to have faith in familiar landmarks that any
human being can recognize. Some may fear that this assumption would cripple our
critical faculties; but if this were the case (as Blondel has pointed out) we wouldn’t
have been able to develop and use them in the first place. Hermeneuticians seem to say
something similar – except that they assume that people from different backgrounds
share less than they think. We would only understand others insofar as their and our
interpretations tally; and we may end up understanding only our own projections. I
would say we always share more than we think, and in practice always assume we do.
One thing we ought to remember is this: the other we see through a philosophical lens
is never the same as the other we meet; and once we realize this, we have reason to say,
abusing Rimbaud’s words, “Je est un autre.”
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